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In a heady cocktail of philosophical, psychological, and neuro-
physiological ingredients, Solms offers psychoanalysis a purported
life-giving potion he claims will liberate it from subservience to reduc-
tionist neuroscientists like Crick and naturalist/realist philosophers
like Searle. Psychoanalysis need only reclaim its classical Freudian
heritage, based philosophically on Kant, to escape these latter-day
enchantments. Unfortunately, Solms’s recipe is made up more of
assertion than explication, leaving us woefully in the dark on how all
this can be accomplished.
Let us start with several of his numerous assertions and then see how
they bear on each other and where they lead us. Let us also not be misled
by the source of some of these assertions, often Freud, because it is what
Solms does with these assertions that will concern us, and not with what
Freud actually did with them or might have done. There are three such
assertions that merit closer scrutiny: (1) All mental processes are
unconscious; (2) consciousness is a “sense organ” for “perceiving” these
mental processes; (3) as any sense organ, consciousness selects and
distorts, making us aware only of what it can, by reason of its own limited
or unique capacities.
Although the sense organ analogy can be useful, Solms’s version
encounters serious problems because it is so vital for him to assert that
consciousness as a sense organ rides above and, most important to his
argument, is totally independent of both external and internal reality,
both the realm of objects and events outside us and the presumed
psychic realm inside us. Consciousness emerges as a deus in machina,
an entity made of stuff different from the mental and the physical. It is
in fact remarkably similar to Bishop Berkeley’s God, who guarantees
that our world of appearances is sustained in the absence of any truly
knowable, independent reality. Although Solms starts with Kantian
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transcendentalism, he slides into Berkeleyan idealism because by
implication his assertions do not accord his sense organ view of con-
sciousness any ontological status as part of reality.
Solms’s misreading of Freudian texts is further supported by the
vagueness of his discussion of the sense organ analogy itself. Nowhere
does he undertake to describe (or for that matter suggest or indicate)
how consciousness as a sense organ might work. He simply asserts that
consciousness makes us uniquely aware of affect along the dimension
of pleasant-unpleasant, of external perceptions, and of the memory of
past perceptions. But does it not also make us aware of our thoughts and
judgments, to name two mental events that do not appear to be simply
memories of past perceptions but involve performing the various
operations on memories and perceptions that we mean by reasoning?
Freud was aware of this problem and attempted to solve it by
hypothesizing that thoughts can become conscious only by activating
verbal traces possessing an auditory sensory quality that presumably can
be “perceived” by consciousness. This explanation falls short because
these activated verbal traces function not simply as perceptions or
memories, but as counters in reasoning that may themselves be conscious. 
Once we begin to introduce into the discussion of consciousness the
awareness and operation of such mental events as thought, judgment,
and reasoning, we are already pushing the limits of the sense organ
analogy. Vision does not provide us with thoughts about what we see,
or judgments; nor does it perform reasoning on visual sensations. And
once we arrive at this point, the sense organ analogy loses its totalistic
explanatory power.
But how might we avoid the dualistic pitfall that Solms has
apparently fallen into without knowing it? Before we attempt an answer,
a brief review of how Freud treated consciousness at different stages of
his thinking will prove instructive. Freud, we will see, was the kind of
intuitive theoretician whose successive theories did not necessarily
supersede one another; rather, as he solved one problem others solved
earlier at times reemerged. An example pertinent to our inquiry is the
relationship of the early topographic theory to the later structural theory.
Freud’s thinking about consciousness went through at least three
main stages: (1) consciousness as a quality of mental events, (2) con-
sciousness as a mental system, and (3) consciousness as an ego func-
tion linked closely to perception, a conception that includes the notion
of consciousness as a sense organ.
747
Consciousness as a quality of mental events. In his earliest and
simplest theory, which had the virtue of being conceptually close to the
clinical phenomena, Freud theorized that an idea (a classical nineteenth-
century psychological concept) could exist in three states vis-à-vis
consciousness: it could be conscious, preconscious (easily acquiring the
quality of consciousness), or unconscious (acquiring the quality of
consciousness only with difficulty). On this model one can say that the
relationship of an idea to consciousness was operationally defined. The
criteria for determining the status of an idea with respect to consciousness
were clear: if you are aware of it, it is conscious; if you can voluntarily
become aware of it, it is preconscious; if voluntary efforts at recall fail,
it is unconscious. Moreover, this theory can accommodate the presence
of consciousness in any psychological state. The quality of being
conscious is present equally in normal waking consciousness, dream
consciousness, fugue states, psychotic conditions, states of intoxication,
dissociative states, etc. Consciousness is simply a condition of subjective
awareness. Equivalently, in any of these states there are preconscious
and unconscious ideas. There are dream elements we are immediately
conscious of, others we readily become aware of (often as we report the
dream), and still others we cannot summon to consciousness; these last
remain unconscious, and constitute the latent dream.
Intrinsic to this model is the notion of threshold (or barrier, as
Freud preferred to call it) and the allied notion of intensity along a vari-
ety of dimensions. The threshold for a preconscious idea to become
conscious is low, and its becoming conscious is mainly a function of its
intensity. Most everyday perceptions are of this nature—moving easily
from an initial preconscious to a conscious condition. The threshold for
an unconscious idea to become conscious is much higher and can
counteract even the most intense idea, as in repression. This model
remains enormously useful in accommodating the findings of sublimi-
nal perception, which the two other models (described below) have
trouble with, a fact beautifully addressed by Fisher (1957). The model
also remains clinically useful at an experience-near level: if a patient
has difficulty—for example, in remembering important material from a
recent session—we suspect repression.
In this model, consciousness is a property of mental processes
emerging under certain conditions: thus, it is intrinsically mental and
not a sense organ set over and above the mental, as in Solms’s version
of the sense organ analogy. How consciousness emerges as a property
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of a given idea, and what psychological and neurophysiological condi-
tions need to be present for that to happen, become askable and
researchable questions in both the consulting room and the laboratory,
as we have begun to show in our research (Shevrin et al. 1996).
Consciousness as a system. In this model Freud abandoned con-
sciousness with a small “c” for a systems view of consciousness with a
big “C.” In so doing he was attempting to forge a protostructural model
according to which one psychological state—the normal waking
state—was given primacy and only its consciousness with a small “c”
was provided with certain specific functions allied closely to waking
perception. Thus, in the main, reality testing based on the secondary
process was ascribed to this particular psychological state and its asso-
ciated subjective awareness (small “c” consciousness), as well as the
capacity for self-reflection, or the awareness of being aware, for which
there was no provision in the topographic model.
But something was also lost in this model, what we can call, along
with Edelman (1989), primary consciousness—that is, immediate
subjective awareness without any accompanying reflectiveness, the kind
of consciousness that is present most of the time and is described by
William James (1890), in his felicitous phrase, as the stream of
consciousness that flows and only occasionally slows into an awareness
of itself. Further, by Freud’s closely allying this structural view of
consciousness to perception so that the latter had always first to be
conscious, any interaction between the external world and preconscious
and unconscious processes became in theory impossible. This did not
make clinical sense, nor could this view accommodate the increasing
body of subliminal research, in which it was repeatedly demonstrated
that external stimuli can be perceived subliminally and interact with
unconscious processes to later surface in dreams, images, and
associations without any waking- state awareness of their source.
As Freud does in this systems model, Solms conflates primary con-
sciousness (small “c”) occurring in one particular psychological state,
the normal waking state, with certain functions of that state such as
self-reflectiveness; as a result, consciousness emerges as a particular
agency of that state rather than as simply a quality of subjective aware-
ness that can accompany any state. I will return to this important dis-
tinction and its implications below.
It is also important to note that in this systems model Freud still
conceives of consciousness, albeit with a big C, as an intrinsic part of
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the mental apparatus, rather than as a sense organ apart from it, as
implied by Solms’s view.
Consciousness as an ego function or sense organ. As is well
known, Freud shifted to the structural model of id, ego, and superego in
part because he realized that defenses, belonging to the system Cs,
operated unconsciously, creating the paradox of an unconscious process
belonging to a system controlled by consciousness. By establishing the
ego as a superordinate agency, he could accommodate within this
agency both conscious and certain unconscious processes such as
defenses. Although the notion of consciousness as a particular ego
function assuming the character of a sense organ had its precursors in
Freud’s thinking, it was in the structural model that the sense organ
analogy made the most sense. There is a powerful appeal, which Solms
attempts to exploit, to imagining an instrumentality, modeled on a sense
organ like vision, that can “perceive” our mental life as our eyes per-
ceive the external world. Ironically, Crick (one of Solms’s targets for
attack) and others have employed a related metaphor, likening con-
sciousness to a searchlight illuminating otherwise “dark” regions of the
world or our minds. But as I have tried to show, there is a danger lurk-
ing in this seductive metaphor unless one is careful—the danger of
implicitly requiring a dualistic, idealistic solution to the problem of
consciousness which essentially leaves us with an explanation by fiat,
providing no clinical utility or any purchase for research. The sense
organ or searchlight becomes essentially an homunculus.
The Freud-Rapaport solution. Elsewhere I have attempted to bring
together a theory of consciousness based essentially on Rapaport’s sys-
tematizing of Freud’s “apparatus of consciousness” (Rapaport 1960).
Rapaport stressed that to his knowledge no one since Freud had
attempted to describe such an apparatus (Shevrin in press a).
According to Rapaport, the primary function of consciousness as an
apparatus is to distribute attention cathexis to excitations emerging from
external and internal sources—ultimately the sense organs for external
excitations, and the instincts for internal sources. It is this distribution
of attention cathexis that confers consciousness, but if and only if it is
above a certain threshold (note the importance of the threshold concept,
as in Freud’s first theory of consciousness with a small “c,” which lost
its importance in the systems and structural theory). If this cathexis is
not above the threshold for consciousness, the excitation nevertheless
achieves mental representation, can leave a memory trace, but not
C o m m e n t a r i e s
750
WHAT IS CONSCIOUSNESS?
become conscious. By introducing a threshold concept, the Freud-
Rapaport theory can incorporate the findings of subliminal research
without difficulty. Moreover, this function of distributing attention
cathexis, rendering an excitation conscious, can occur in any
psychological state, thus accommodating the concept of primary
consciousness by not tying consciousness to one particular state, as in
the systems theory of consciousness with a capital C and the structural
theory, thus confounding reflective and primary consciousness.
The distribution of attention cathexis is itself nonmotivational,
meaning that attention cathexis will activate any mental content with-
out bias unless other forces not intrinsic to its distributing function,
such as the imminence of a psychic danger, intervenes. This unbiased,
nonmotivational nature of attention cathexis is vital, because it alone
makes possible the most important overall function of consciousness,
which is the provision of indications of reality. It cannot itself be biased
and perform that function.
I have proposed elsewhere and presented evidence in support of the
hypothesis that consciousness in whatever psychological state serves to
tag the particular conscious mental content in terms of the mental
category to which it belongs (Shevrin 1992, in press b). Thus, in a
dream state, the little “c” consciousness that is present tags the content
as a dream so that it can be recalled as such. When consciousness is not
present and a stimulus below threshold is cathected and forms a
memory trace, as in a subliminal experiment, the mental content can
return as part of a dream, image, or association, but it will not be
identified as a perception because it has not been tagged as such con-
sciously (for a different view of this function, see Brakel 1989). I have
further proposed that repression undoes this tagging function of
primary consciousness so that mental contents under repression no
longer belong to a particular mental category; repressed contents are
thereby rendered timeless in the sense that no category distinction
obtains between memory and perception.
Let us now return to Solms with this brief review of some
psychoanalytic theories of consciousness behind us. In none of these
theories is there any adherence to a mind-brain dualism or outright
philosophical idealism. To an important though still limited extent, the
topographic model can quite comfortably be related to contemporary
cognitive psychology and neuroscience. In terms of the topographic
model, the preconscious has found a place in contemporary cognitive
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and neuroscience thinking; the unconscious still remains beyond the
pale, though there is some new psychological and neurophysiological
evidence on unconscious motivation that may in time overcome that
exclusion.
In his attack on neuroscience, Solms appears to be take aim mainly
at reductionist neurophysiological theories such as Crick’s. But
consciousness can be viewed as an emergent property of brain
organization, a point argued by Sperry (1969) and Searle (1992).
Finally, there are theories extant, as I have tried to indicate, that
provide a mechanism or apparatus of consciousness that not only explains
more, but also does not encounter the difficulties that Solms meets in
treating consciousness as a sense organ and implicit homunculus.
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